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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE SALTAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business under name and style of D.
A. AFFLECK GROCERY,
Defendant
KENNETH BlJITE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 6190

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
The appellant charges counsel for respondent with
bad faith, deliberate misconduct and with a systematic
plan of procedure to obtain an unjust verdict through
reference to the fact that the appellant is protected by an
insurance company.
Before going into the questions raised in appellant's
brief, we desire to state that counsel for the appellant
have deliberately overlooked matters which would cure
any defect in single instructions claimed to be erroneouA,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a.nd have based much of their brief on a deliberate misquotation of the record. For instance, counsel for appel·
lant in their brief on page 53 claim that counsel, in
his closing argument to the jury stated: "on the day of
the accident or soon thereafter an investigator or an adjuster was out at the scene of the accident." Counsel
have deliberately added the words, ··or adjuster" to the
sentence (Tr. 321), and based upon such misquotation
devote a good portion of their argument for new trial.
Appellant also complains about certain of the Court's
instructions as being erroneous, hut he fails to mention
admissions in the pleadings and record, and the instruc·
tions which would cure all objections raised by the ap·
pellant.
It is elementary that the trial court's instructions,
although separately given, are to he construed as a
whole, yet, counsel for the appellant ingeniously omitted
and failed to recognize this fundamental rule. We make
these opening remarks so that this Court will get the
proper p~rspective upon the appellant's argument and
that this case will he decided in accordance to what .ap·
pears in the entire record, and not as to what the appellant would like to have the record show.
The respondent will argue the questions involved in
this case in the order raised by the appellant.

The trial court has the power and authority to gr/Jf&t
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a new trial when in its discretion it deems the verdict of
the jury inadequate or unjust and such action will not
be interferred with, except where there is a clear abuse
of discretion.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the death of his son, who was killed in an automobile collision at the intersection of Third Avenue
and ..K.. Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the time of the collision, plaintiffs son was riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by one Gerald
Franz when the defendant Kenneth Butte drove his
truck against the Franz automobile when the same was
almost over the intersection, and fatally injured Mr.
Saltas.
At the time of his death, the deceased was earning
$2000.00 a year as a machinist, was thirty years of age
and had a life expectancy of thirty-five years; was in

good robust health; lived with plaintiff and the other
members of the family, and contributed most of his
earnings to the plaintiff for his support and for- the
support of plaintiff's family. The plaintiff had been ill
for some time and the deceased was giving him financial
aid to keep the family going. That deceased throughout
his life had worked with his father on a farm, and worked
at Bingham Canyon, Utah, for the Utah Copper Company, and during the depression contributed practically
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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all .of his check to the family. We make this statement
because it has been omitted by the appellant in his
Statement of the case.
The jury, in the first case against Kenneth Butte,
the appellant herein, returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the sum of ·$800. 00. The plaintiff filed a
motion for a new trial, alleging the statutory grounds
and asking for· new trial upon the ground that, under
the law and the evidence, the damages awarded by the
jury were inadequate and that the verdict was rendered
under misapprehension of the instructions, or under the
influence of passion or prejudice. The motion was argued
and at the conclusion thereof the court stated:
THE COURT: "I am inclined to think at this time
that the verdict is too low; I do not mean to say that I
will find it low, but the matter will be taken under advisement." (Tr. 430)
Thereafter the court made an order that plaintiff's
motion for new trial be granted unless the defendant,
Kenneth Butte, within twenty days after notice consent
that the verdict of the jury be increased to $2400.00, and
judgment entered accordingly .
. The defendant did not give his consent to such an
increase and the case was set for trial for a second time.
Upon the second trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,061.00.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The appellant argues that the order granting a new
trial was void because there was no showing that there
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions
of the court or the evidence. and the trial court could not
increase the verdict.
In answer to these contentions. all that need he said
is that the function of a motion for a new trial in cases
where the cause was tried before a jury is to give the
trial court an opportunity to set aside any verdict which
is the result of passion or prejudice or misunderstanding,
or which is grossly unjust between the parties.
The trial court had heard the evidence and had
before it the instructions and it was very apparent
from the evidence that the decedent and Gerald Franz,
the driver of the car which decedent had been riding
as a passenger, were free from any contributory negligence9 and that the appellant herein was guilty of the
grossest kind of negligence in the driving and operation
of his truck.
The case was submitted to the jury at 5:05 p. m.
and the jury returned at 6:05 p.m.-within one hour. (Tr.
25) It was apparent to the court that the jury returned
"a quick verdict" and that it did not go fully into the
instructions and the evidence; and that the plaintiff,
if he was entitled to any judgment at all, was entitled to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
a substantial sum. The court's judgment in the case that
plaintiff was entitled to a substantial sum is strengthened by the second verdict rendered in the case in the
sum of $3,061.00.
The fact that the trial court gave the appellant
an opportunity to save himself a new trial by consenting to increase in the judgment, w.as certainly not harmful or prejudicial in any manner to his interests. He was
not forced to accept the increase nor did he accept it;
so, there is no reason for any complaint to he made on
his part. If any of the parties were prejudiced by such
an order it would have been the plaintiff, who would
have been precluded from a new trial had the appellant
consented to the increase of the judgment.
The appellant further argues that the court improperly granted a new trial because there is no statutory ground provided in motion for new trials based upon
inadequate damages appearing to have been given by
a jury under the influence of passion, prejudice, or misunderstanding. This contention has no merit. Section
104-40-7, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, reads as follows:
"The verdict of a Jury may also he vacated
and a new trial granted by the court in which
the action is pending, on its own motion, without
the application of either of the parties, when
there has been a plain disregard by the jury of
the instructions of the court or the evidence in
the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict
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was rendered under a misapprehension of such
instructions or under the influence of passion or
prejudice."
In Klinge vs. Southern Pacific Company, 89 Utah
284, 57 Pacific (2nd) 367
This court, on page 373, stated:
"The court also within its descretion was
justified and authorized to grant a new trial on
the ground that the verdict was inadequate, in
view of the undisputed evidence that the earning capacity of the plaintiff during the last 10
years prior to the accident was about $2,000 a
year, that since his disability he was unable to
follow or be employed in his usual occupation of
railroading or in any other employment of gain
or profit or of any substantial remuneration, and
since his injury he was unable to earn and had
not earned anything. Under all the authorities,
great latitude is accorded the trial court in such
matter. Cases are cited by appellant where verdicts of $10,000 or less for the loss of an arm were
regarded as adequate compensation; but in most
such cases the earning capacity of the injured
plaintiff was much less than that of the plaintiff
in the instant case. In such particular, each case
is dependent upon its own facts, and what may
be inadequate compensation in the one may he
he adequate in the other. Hence, a wide discretion is given the trial court in such matter and
rarely is interfered with by an appellate tribunal whether the awarded compensation by the
court below was held adequate or inadequate. In
46 C. J. 207, the rule is stated that inadequate
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compensation for an injury sustained is generally ground for a new trial, and that a statute
providing that •the jury may give such damages
as under all the circumstances of the case may
to them seem just,' does not affect the court's
right to grant a new trial where it deems the
damages inadequate. In the case of Dorset v.
Chambers, 187 Mo. App. 276, 173 S. W. 725, the
court said that in tort cases the trial judge is
as much a trier of facts as the jury and is charged
with the final duty of doing justice between the
parties. The question before him for solution
where the plaintiff asks for a new trial on the
ground of an inadequate verdict is not whether
the assessment is so inadequate as to shock the
judicial conscience and bespeak passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, but whether it
is out of line with the evidentiary facts and circumstances as the judge sees and understands
them.
That no abuse of discretion in the instant
case was committed by the trial court. * * * The
rule is well established that a presumption exists
that a trial court did not err or abuse his discretion in granting or refusing a new trial, and
that the burden is upon him complaining of the
ruling to show a clear abuse of discretion. Utah
State Nat. Bank vs. Livingston, 69 Utah 284,
254 P. 781; Thomas v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co.,
47 Utah 595, 155 P. 436; Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44
Utah 88, 138 P. 1172; White v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; Alt. v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co., 5 S. D. 20, 57 N. W. 1126, 1128: Koch
v. Imhof, 315 Pa. 145, 172 AJ. 672, 673; O'Barr
v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 172 S. C. 72, 172 S. E.
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J. 798. In the case af Alt. v. Chicago,
etc, Ry. Co., supra, that court, in a personal in...
jury case, stated that: 'It requires a court as well
as a jury to try causes of this nature, and, while
the jury is the judge of the facts viewed in the
light of the law, as a rule no verdict should stand
when, in the sound judgment of the trial court,
its operates as a wrong between the parties which
might be remedied upon a retrial.' "

769; .(. C.

~

The foregoing holds that the court has the discretion, where it deems the verdict of a jury as inadequate
to grant a new trial; and the burden is upon him who
complains of the ruling to show a clear abuse of discretion. We cannot see any abuse of such discretion in

this

case~

In 46 C. J., p. 207, dealing with the question of inadequate damages, n ~ stated:
"While formerly at common law, it seems, a
verdict in an action of tresspass could not he
set aside at all for inadequacy, now a new trial
for inadequacy of damages is largely in the discretion of the court. That the damages recovered
are clearly inadequate compensation for the injury sustained is generally ground for a new trial.
And a statute providing that 'jury may give such

damages as, under all circumstances of the case
may to them seem jzut,' does not affect the court's
right to grant a new trial where it deems the
damages inadequate."
In the case of Pierre v. Powell Box Co., 77 So. 943,
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a verdict of $2500.00 was held inadequate and increased
to $7500.00 for the death of a laborer whose parents
brought an action for his death fo:r; loss of prospective
support, companionship and filial affection.
In Gibson v. Wineman, 106 So. 826, a verdict of
$500.00 for the death of a decedent 37 years of age and
earning $2.00 a day, was held to be so inadequate as to
evince bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.
In Skidmore v. Seattle, 244 P. 545, a verdict of
$1200.00 was increased to $2500.00 for loss of the services
of a son 15 years of age who earned 25 to 30 cents an
hour, while working.
In Wirth v. Alex Dussell Iron Works, 74 So. 551,
a verdict of $3000.00 was increased to $6000.00 for the
death of the decedent who was 45 years of age.
In Berry v. Dewey, 172 P. 27, a' verdict of $5000.00
to the mother of decedent, where decedent was 33 years
old and in good health and able to earn about $1000.00 a
year, was held not to be excessive.
In El Paso Ry. Co. v. Buttery, 216 S. W. 897, a ver·
diet of $10,000.00 to the mother of the decedent, where
decedent was 24 years old, unmarried, and earned $125.00
per month, and the mother was 54 years old, was held
not to be excessive.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of Bright v. Thatcher, 215 S. W. 788, a
verdict of $?500.00 to the mother of the deceased, where
deceased was 49 years old and earned $125.00 per month,
and the mother was ?4 years old, was held not to be excessive.
In McMahon v. Flynn, 191 N. Vl. 902, a verdict of
$5500.00 to the mother, who had a life expectancy of 12
years and decendent was 29 years old and earned $110.00
per month, was held to be reasonable.
In Louisville Railway Co. v. Smith, 263 S. W. 29, a
verdict for $15,000.00 to the administrator of the estate
of the decedent, who was 2? years old and had a life
expectancy of more than 30 years and was earning $300.00
per month, was held to be reasonable.
While hundreds of cases can be cited on this question, such cases are only for persuasive purposes and are
not in any way binding on the court, because the court
has the discretionary power to deal with each case upon
its own merits.
The reason that it is necessary, where a jury passes
upon questions of fact, to file a motion for a new trial
is to give the court the opportunity to set aside any judgment which is the result of passion or prejudice or misunderstanding or which is grossly unjust between the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parties. We submit that the verdict in the first case was
inadequate and the result of bias and prejudice on the
part of the jury, and was properly set aside and a new
trial granted.

There was no error relating to insurance indemnification.
Before the jury was drawn, counsel for the appellant stated:
MR. STEWART: If your Honor please, at this
time I wish to offer in evidence Policy Number AU 206787,
issued by the Northwest Casualty Company, on the 28th
day of September, 1937, and effective from that date
until the 28th day of September, 1938, and covering the
period when this accident occurred, being a policy issued
to D. A. Affleck doing business as Affleck Grocery,
which has been identified as "Exhibit 1," the same being
offered for the purpose that I am about to mention, and
for no other purpose, and particularly paragraph 5, on
page 2, defined the insured, which paragraphing reads as
follows:

"V.

DEFINITION OF 'INSURED'

"The unqualified word

***

MR. METOS: I object to him reading anything.
you Honor.
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MR. STEW ART:

I offer it in evidence and partic-

ularly this paragraph. (Tr. 18-19)
The appellant claimed that he introduced the policy
of insurance to show that he was not covered under it.
The policy was received into evidence upon the insistence
of appellant's conusel and over the objection of the plaintiff. It was received as an exhibit for the court and not
for the jury.
The appellant complains that the plaintiff committed error in the voir dire examination of the jury
because they were interrogated as to whether or not they
were officers, agents, or stockholders of the Northwest
Casualty Company, the insurance company, which issued the policy of insurance that was introduced into
evidence. Appellant says that it was apparent that asking each juror individually those questions was to "tell
them" of the existence of liability insurance.
Contrary to what the appellant states in his brief,
it appears from the examination that jurors Langton
and Wilson were agents of a casualty company. Certainly, where it is shown that a casualty company is
interested in the action by reason of the issuance of a
policy, it is an interested party, and plaintiff is entitled to interrogate the respective juror if they are
connected with such a company as officers, agents, or
stockholders, Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 1?9, 1? P. (2d) 224.
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The fact that some of the jurors were not engaged in
the insurance business does not necessarily mean that
they might not be interested in casualty companies. Liability insurance is a common business, and people in the
various walks of life may be interested in it as stockholders or otherwise. In this day and age it is not uncommon for widows, farmers, workmen, professional men,
und other people engaged in various occupations to invest their money in insurance companies.
In Eagan vs. O'Malley, (Wyo.) 21 P. (2d) 821, counsel in that case complained that by reason of the fact
that most of the jury panel was composed of ranchers or
farmers, it was bad faith on the part of counsel for
the plaintiff to interrogate the jurors as to whether they
were interested in a casualty insurance company, the
court stated:
"The examination of jurors on voir dire,
when properly conducted, as all members of the
profession know, serves a useful purpose in selecting triers of fact. Among other things, it enables
both parties, plaintiff and defendant alike, to
know the relationship, if any, existing between
any juror and a party who, though he may not
appear so of record, it still a party in interest ...
"As a result of an extended examination of
the cases dealing with the question, we consider it
easily deducible that the great weight of authority
and the better reasoning alike sanction the view
that counsel for the plaintiff is entitled in good
faith to inquire whether any juror is interested
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in or connected with any insurance or casualty
company that may be interested in the case as an
insurer of the defendant's liability. See 35 C. J.
394, 56 A. L. R. 14~. note; 74 A. L. R. 860, note.
Some of the more recent cases approving this
rule-all decided during the year 1932-are: Morton v. Holscher (S. D.) 243 N. W. 89: Halbrook v.
Williams, 185 Ark. 885, 50 S. W. (2d) 243; Jenkins
v. Chase (Mo. Sup.) 53 S. W. (2d) 21; Wack v.
F. E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 53 S W.
(2d) 28; Pate vs. Pickwick Stages System (Cal.
App.) 14 P. (2d) 1?4; Balle v. Smith (Utah) 17
P. (2d) 224.
"In the case at bar, nothing appears in the
record that we can see which would indicate that
co1msel was not propounding the inquiry quoted
above in good faith. . . . The fact that most of
the jury panel was composed of ranchers or
farmers does not make the possibility of finding
one interested in liability insurance so remote as
to indicate bad faith on counsel's part. Liability
insurance is a common business and people in
many walks of life are more or less interested
in it."
The questions propounded to the jurors were made
m good faith and in conformity with the rules laid
down in the Balle vs. Smith case, supra. In this case
there is no question that the Northwest Casualty Company is an interested party in the action. Its policy is
one of the exhibits in this case. It was an unorthodox
procedure for the appellant to offer such policy into
evidence, and it seems to plaintiff that the appellant was
laying a ground work for an appeal by introducing such

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
policy, so that in the event of an adverse judgment he
could predicate an argutnent that the jury brought a
verdict against him because he was backed by an insurance company, and by grasping here and there at unavoidable statements, some of which the appellant has
stretched beyond recognition, and so urges this court
to grant him a new trial.
The appellant further complains that counsel committed misconduct by asking one of the appellant's witnesses, Norma Chamberlain, who was riding in the truck
with the appellant at the time of the accident, if she
"gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson,
who is an adjuster for an insurance company." This witness had testified on direct examination that she saw the
Franz car before it entered the intersection and that, in
her opinion, it was traveling at the rate of 40 miles per
hour. (Tr. 192).
Counsel for plaintiff called her attention to the fact
that she had previously testified in the case of State vs.
Kenneth Butte, and at that trial stated that the first time
she saw the Franz coupe "was when it loomed right in
front of you." (Tr. 196)
The witness answered: "I don't remember."
Q. And do you remember making this statement,
that the first time that you saw the Ford coupe was when
it loomed right in front of you?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

A.

1 don't remember.

Q. Do you remember making such a statement~
to the effect that the first time you saw it was when
the Ford Coupe loomed right in front of you?
A.

I don't know exactly what it was

Q.

You were - - -

MR. STEWART:

What were you going to say?

A. I want to say that the car loomed in front of
me, I saw it before it came in front of us.

Q. (By Mr. Metos) In other words, as I understand you, you want to say you saw this car prior to
the time it entered the intersection, is that what you
want us to believe, or did you see it just as it got in
front of you, a few feet away?
A.

Well, I saw, then it was right in front of me.

Q. Did you see it right in front of you. That is
what I mean. You saw it when it was in front of you,
for the first time?
A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Now, let me call your attention to this. Right
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after the accident you made out an affidavit to-you
gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson,
who is an adjuster for an Insurance company?
MR. STEWART:
MR. METOS:

Just a moment.

I want to know.

MR. STEWART: Just a moment, if your Honor
please; I assign that as prejudicial misconduct. Mr. Parkinson is associated with me. I take an exception to counsel's statement and at this time I ask that the jury he
discharged; prejudicial misconduct of the worst kind,
and counsel there knows it is, or should know it.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

Q. (By Mr. Metos) You made a statement to him,
did you not?

A.

Yes.

Q. And you stated to him, when he took your
statement, that when you saw the Ford car it was going
thirty-five miles an hour, didn't you?
A.

Yes, about that.

Q. And on cross examination on April 4th, you
stated right here in this court room that you didn't see
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the car, and that the statement you made, going thirtyfive miles an hour, wasn't true. Do you recall that?
A.

I don't remember saying that.

Q. You stated that in this statement you made,
that you had made a mistake as to the speed when you
saw this car. That is right, isn't it?

A. I don't recall making-saying that I didn't
know, I couldn't judge the speed of the car.
Q. I didn't ask you about judgment the speed of
the car, I asked you if you didn't make a statement to
Parkinson to the effect when you saw the Ford car it
was going thirty-five miles all hour, and later on, on cross
examination here, by Marion Romney, you admitted
that you did not make such a statement, although it
already appeared in your statement or affidavit or whatever you want to call it. That is right," isn't it?

A.
Q.
you?

I don't remember.
You wouldn't say you didn't make .it, would

A.

I don't remember making it.

Q.

What is that?
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A.

I don't remember making it.

Q. You don't remember making it, but would you
say you did not make it, positively?
MR. STEWART: I have her statement here if you
want to see it, the original affidavit that she signed, if
you want to see it. If you want to see it, I will be glad
to let you have it.
MR. METOS:

That isn't the one.

MR. STEWART: That is the affidavit she made to
Mr. Parkinson-the statement she made to him on January 28, 1938. (Tr. 196-198)
The plaintiff had the right to examine the witness
as to any prior inconsistent statement that she may have
made to any person. Her statement on direct examination
that she saw the Franz car before it entered the intersection, traveling 40 miles per hour was pertinent to the
issues in this case. The witness kept hedging the ques·
tion by stating, "I don't remember," when asked if it
was a fact that she did not see the Franz car until it was
directly in front of her. It was important to show that
the witness had previously told Parkinson and the officers that she had never seen the car until it loomed
right in front of the car she was riding in.
As already indicated the witness stated in her direct
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examination that she saw the car traveling at 40 miles
per hour. Upon cross examination concerning the statement she gave to Parkinson she stated that the car was
traveling at 35 miles per hour. We see nothing wrong in
asking a witness if she talked to a certain person who
took a statement from her as a represenative of a company. Any sting that the question has was offset by
counsel for the appellant who promptly stated that "Mr.
Parkinson is associated with me." There is no indication that the verdict in this case was in any way influenced by the question complained of. The question was
asked in good faith. Any error in this statement was
cured by the court's instruction number 29 which instructed the jury not to consider the question of insurance.
(Tr. 316) The re-direct examination of Miss Chamberlain
concerning her statement to Parkinson clearly indicated
that she had made a statement and it was certainly
relevant and competent to call her attention to any prior
inconsistent statements she may have made to Parkmson.
In the case of Reid vs. Owens, (Utah) 93 P. (2d) 680,
this court stated:
"Despite the general rule which excludes
testimony showing liability insurance, it nevertheless may he received in evidence when an allusion to insurance is part of an admission of liahilty or responsibility. Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont.
229, 240, 33 P. (2d) 547; Smith v. Baggett, 218 Ala.
227, 118 So. 283; O'Connor v. Sioux Falls Motor
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Co., 57 S. D. 39?, 232 N. W. 904; Herschensohn
v. Weisman, 80 N. H. 557, 119 A. 705; 28 A. L. R.
514; Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal. App.
(2d) 46, 57,64 P. (2d) 1153, 1159; Rowe vs. Rennick,
112 Cal. App. 576, 585, 297 P. 603; Potter v. Driver,
97 Cal. App. 311, 317, 275 P. 526; Nichols v. Nelson, 80 Cal. App. 590, 596, 252 P. 739; and annotation in 56 A. L. R. 1418, 1448; 74 A. L. R. 849,
856, 95 A. L. R. 388; 105 A. L. R. 1319, 1326. See,
also, Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 192, 17 P (2d)
224.

"To hold it reversible error to permit allusions to insurances, though such allusions are in
themselves admissions, would be to reject otherwise competent testimony, material to the issue-indeed, perhaps the only material evidence on a
vital issue-on the assumption that the jury would
disregard its plain duty and resolve the ques·
tion of defendant's liability, not on the evidenre
relative to his wrong, but on that respecting who
would ultimately have to pay."
In the above case the reference was to the effect
that the defendant carried liability insurance. In this
case there is nothing to indicate that Butte carried insurance.
The appellant further claims that counsel for the
plaintiff in his argument to the jury stated "on the day
of the accident or soon thereafter, an investigator or
adjuster was out at the scene of the accident.'• We have
already pointed out that this is a deliberate misquotation of the record because counsel have added the words
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or adjuster to the quotation. (Tr. 321) Counsel also claims
it was error to state that the "defendant' secured an attorney who spends all his time in the defense of this
class of cases:· The record shows this objection or complaint was made after the arguments to the jury were
closed and ''when the jury left the court room." The
objection, if you can call it that, should have been made
when the purported statements were alleged to have been
made to the jury so that the court could have corrected
counsel in the presence of the jury. The objection, not
being timely, should not be considered. If it is to he
considered there is no merit to the same because it is
not in accordance to what appears in the record and not
of a prejudicial nature.
There were no erroneous instructions given to the
jury, and any error in any instruction was waived by
the appellant by virtue of admissions and by requesting
similar instructions.
The appellant states that the court's instruction No.
11 was erroneous because it "failed to take into con-

sideration the right of the defendant to assume that
all persons would lawfully use the highway and would
exercise reasonable and ordinary care until put upon
notice to the contrary."
: The court's instructions, particularly Nos. 22 and
23, overcame this ob.jection and quoting from the latter
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instruction, the court instructed as follows: "You are
further instructed that the defendant, in driving his
automobile was not an insurer of the safety of Spero
Saltas, or, in fact, of any person -J: ~·: * And was not
hound to anticipate unexpected acts of others, but had
a right to assume that all other persons using the highway and particularly driving automobiles would use
reasonable and ordinary care and would not violate the
law unless and until defendant became advised to the
contrary 7' * * And had a right to assume that the said
Gerald Franz would keep a proper look-out and exercise
reasonable and ordinary care for his own safety and for
the safety of Spero Saltas." (Tr. 311)
Appellant further complains that Instruction No. 12
(Tr. 303) is erroneous, in that the City Ordinance, Section 1382, contained in said instruction, was declared
to he void in the case of State v. Lingman (Utah), 91
P. (2d) 45?', as being contrary to the Utah Statute. The
appellant, however, has waived and is estopped from
questioning the validity of said ordinance in this case.
Plaintiff's cause of action was predicated, among other
things, upon a violation of Section 1382 (B), of the Salt
Lake City Ordinances, and plaintiff alleged in Paragraph
5 of his complaint that said ordinance was, at the time
of the accident. "in full force and effect." (Tr. 3, Ab. 6)
Defendant in his answer admitted "that at the time and
place described in said complaint there was in full
force and effect certain ordinances of Salt Lake City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

relating to traffic and travel upon the streets of Salt

Lake City, including the ordinances limiting the speed
of automobiles in the residential district in Salt Lake City
to 25 miles per hour." (Tr. 15, Ah. 12). The cases are
uniform in their holding that one who desires to rely
upon the invalidity of an ordinance must plead such
fact, and allege facts showing it to he invalid. 43 C. J.,
page 579. In the case of Roper v. Greenspon, et al, (Mo.)
198 S. W. 1107, which was an action for damages for
personal injuries, defendant, in his answer, alleged contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff by
violating a certain city ordinance regulating speed;
plaintiff's reply denied that he violated the said
city ordinance. During the trial, the lower court, upon
objection by plaintiff. refused to admit into evidence
the ordinance pleaded in defendant's answer upon the
ground that the ordinance was in conflict with the state
statute. In holding that the trial court erred in refusing
to admit the city ordinance into evidence, the Supreme
Court said:

"It is true than an ordinance of a city which
conflicts with a state statute is void, hut if a
party is relying upon the fact, such invalidity
should he pleaded, where it appears, as here, that
the adverse party had pleaded and is relying
upon such alleged invalid ordinance. The
invalidity of a statute or ordinance should he
raised at the first opportune moment, and in this
case that opportune moment was the reply. But
the reply in this case proceeds upon the theory
that the ordinance was valid, and specifically
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denies that plaintiff was driving 'at a speed greatily in excess of and in violation of an ordinance of
the city of St. Louis, Mo. at said time in force and
known as section 1551.' From this it appears that
plaintiff not only did not plead the invalidity,
but on the contrary in his reply avers that said
ordinance was 'at said time in force.' This amounts
to a waiver of the alleged invalidity of the ordinance, and it comes too late, when it is urged for the
first time, when the ordinance is offered into
evidence. We take it that the invalidity of an
ordinance, like the unconstitutionality of a law,
must be brought in at the first open door under
the orderly procedure in the case. If the cause
of action be founded upon a pleaded ordinance,
the answer would be the first open door. If the
defense in its answer relies upon a pleaded ordin·
ance, then the reply would be the first open door.
So that we conclude, as both opinions of the Court
of Appeals conclude, that the invalidity of this
ordinance is not in this case."
In the case of Neary, et al, v. Northern Pacific
Ry. Co., (Mont.) 110 P. 226, the plaintiff's complaint
alleged that on the date of the accident there was "in
force in the city of Billings" an ordinance regulating
speed, which had been duly enacted; this allegation was
not met by a general denial in defendant's answer. At
the trial, the ordinance was offered in evidence over defendant's objection upon the ground that the ordinance
was unreasonable and void. Defendants assign such
ruling as error. HELD-Ordinance properly admitted.
"To us it seems clear that the denial in the
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answer simply raises the question as to whether
any such ordinance as that referred to in the
complaint existed. The ordinance did in fact
exist; it was offered into evidence. If for any reason the defendant's desire to take the position that,
on account of peculiar physical conditions, it
ought not to be considered in force and effect in
a particular portion of the city, they should have
set forth the facts upon which their claim of an
exception from the operation of the ordinance was
based."
See, also, American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231,
134 P. 'l39, where, in a prosecution for violating a city
ordinance, our Supreme Court held:
"One charged with violating an ordinance of
a city punishing the illegal sale of liquor, who

desires to assail the power of the city to pass it,
should do so in the local court or in the district
court on appeal, and he cannot raise the question for the first time in the Supreme Court on
appeal, unless perhaps where it appears on the
face of the ordinance that the city exceeded the
power."
The courts apply the same rule where the pleadings
admit the validity of a contract and deny the appellant
the right to assail its validity for the first time on appeal.
See Stewart, Stewart-Morehead Co. v. Bibb Mfg.
Co., (Ga.) 124 S. E. 64.
In the main case, appellant not only admitted the
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existence and validity of the ordinance in his pleadings, but stipulated during the trial that such was the
fact. (Tr. 15?' and 158). If appellant desired to establish
the invalidity of the ordinance he should have alleged
such fact in his answer and objected to the same when
offered into evidence. The validity of an ordinance or
statute cannot be attacked on appeal for the first time.
It must be brought to the attention of the trial court in
the first instance. It does not lie in appellant's mouth to
take exception to an instruction based upon such ordinance and now claim that such instruction was erroneous.
In addition, appellant is estopped from asserting the
invalidity of said ordinance and from attacking Instruction No. 12 upon the doctrine of invited error. A party has
no right to complain of error in an instruction given for the
opposite party, when like error appears in an instruction
given at, his own request. Appellant requested and the
trial court submitted to the jury Instructions No. 16, 19,
and 22 (Tr. 183, 184, 189, and 308) which instructed the
jury, among other things, that if they found that Gerald
Franz was negligent in driving at a speed in excess of
25 miles per hou-r, or in violation of said ordinance, and
such act of negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident, then their verdict must be in favor of the
defendant. In requesting such instruction, appellant ·cartainly did so in contemplation of the validity of said
City Ordinance, Section 1382. One inviting error by asking an instruction erroneously declaring a rule of law,
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cannot except to other instructions so declaring it. The
cases are all to this effect.
· In the case of American Railway Express Co. v.
Lancaster, (Ky.) 251 S. W. 670, the court stated:
"It is first insisted that the court erred in
assuming in its instructions that the violation of
the traffic ordinance of Cincinnati was negligence,
without any proof that such was the law of Ohio.
Though it may he true that the legal effect of
the ordinanc~ as applied to the facts, was not
properly pleaded, there was no objection to the
pleading on that score, and it is apparent, from
all that occurred on the trial, that both parties
not only relied on the ordinance in question, hut
assumed that a violation of its provisions would
constitute negligence. Indeed, appellant offered
the ordinance into evidence, and asked an instruction based upon its provisions. While· this instruction was not given, another instruction embodying
the same provisions was given. Therefore, if it
he conceded that the court erred in the respect
complained of, it is clear that the appellant was
responsible for the error, and is not now in a
position to complain."

See also:
Ashby v. Va. Ry. & Power Co., 122 S. E. 104
Christiansen v. Devine, 210 Ill. App. 253
Duckwall v. Davis, (Ind.) 142 N. E. 113
Thomas v. Frost, 83 Utah 207, 27 P. (2d) 459
Pulos v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 37 Utah 238, 107

P. 241
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Gibson v. Geo. G. Doyle & Co., 37 Utah 21,
106 P. 512
Hunter v. Wm. M. Roylance Co., 45 Utah 135,
143 P. 140.
We submit therefore, that by reason of the foregoing, appellant cannot claim that Instruction No. 12 is
erroneous.
Complaint is made of the court's instruction No. 14
to the effect that it is misleading, in that it failed to
define what constituted a first entry into the intersection. The court's instructions from 20-A to 26 (Tr. 309-14)
fully answers all the objections of the appellant as they
clearly instruct on the duty of drivers when two vehicles
are approaching the intersection at the same time; and
these instructions when considered together, fully and
correctly state the law concerning the right-of-way at
intersections. These instructions obviate all objections
made by the appellant to the court's instructions Nos.
15 and 17.
We understand that its a recognized rule that the
court's instructions, although separately stated, are to be
construed as a whole. This is a stock instruction of all
courts and was given by the trial court in this case in its
instruction No. 31 when it stated: "These instructions,
though numbered separately, are to be considered by
the jury and construed as one connected whole. Each
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instruction should be read and understood with reference
and as a part of the entire charge and not as though any
one instruction were intended to present the whole law
of the case upon any particular point." (Tr. 316)

There was no error committed in refusing appellant's
requested instructions.
As to the contention that the court erroneously
denied appellant's requested instructions, we see no particular instruction which was denied that would in any
way prejudice the rights of the appellant. The court
fully, and more than fairly, instructed the jury as to the
theory of appellant's defense and the matters that appellant complains about in the denial of his requests were
either covered by the instructions given by the court
or were not proper under the evidence, and thereby
denied.

There were rw errors in rulings on the evidence.
We cannot see any error committed by the court on
rulings on the evidence claimed in appellant's assignments of error 28 to 33; the rulings were proper under
the issues in this case. We feel that an examination of
the evidence appearing in the record in this case justifies
our statement that there were no errors committed by
the court in rulings on the evidence; and we feel that
citations on the points raised by the appellant would
he a useless encumbrance upon the time of this court.
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CONCLUSION
While the appellant has raised every possible semblance of an error in his brief and has cited numerous
authorities, such authorities have no application in this
case, and therefore no particular analysis of them is
necessary. We feel, however, that the cases cited in
respondent's brief clearly uphold the position of the
respondent that there was no error committed of such a
prejudicial nature that would entitle appellant to a new
trial. He is certainly not entitled to have the first verdict reinstated because the court was justified in exercising its discretion in granting a new trial, as was shown
by the verdict of the jury in the second trial. There is
nothing in the size of the verdict to indicate that the
jury were influenced by any allusions by references to
insurance. The plaintiff proved a plain case of gross negligence on the part of the appellant in driving his truck.
Plaintiff suffered a great injury in the loss of his son,
not only from a financial point of view, but from a
standpoint in the loss of his son's society, comfort and
companionship which no pecuniary benefits can replace. There is nothing more precious than life, and no
court should interfere with a judgment which was fairly
rendered unless the wrong-doer has been prejudiced in
his rights. We submit that there is no error in the record
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in this case and that the judgment of the trial court

should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
H. G. METOS,
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN,
.Attorneys for Respondent
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